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Abstract 
 
This chapter explores entrepreneur-investor relations from a cognitive perspective. I show that 
entrepreneurs’ and investors’ specific mindsets matter for the perception and realization of 
strategic opportunity. Differences in cognitive structure and process thus influence value 
creation beyond economizing on agency costs. I define and add concepts of cognitive cost and 
cognitive value to a basic agency model, which allows me to explain why some entrepreneur-
investor relations create more value than others, although they may have the same level of 
agency costs. This enhanced framework also helps understand why external funding may not 
be available to certain ventures, even if agency conflicts can be kept under control through 
proper incentive alignment. The concepts of cognitive cost and value are shown to be 
especially relevant in the context of entrepreneurial finance, where uncertainty is typically 
high, and knowledge about value creation opportunities is ambiguous. An investor’s 
appreciation of the value of entrepreneurs’ knowledge about strategic opportunity depends on 
the closeness of their respective mindsets. Some investor-types such as venture capitalists 
share certain of the entrepreneurs’ mental features and develop specific skills to identify 
valuable ventures at a low cognitive cost while adding cognitive value through strategic 
advice and mentoring, especially when entrepreneurs are still unexperienced. 
 
Introduction 
 
For many years finance scholars have examined the relationship between founder/managers 
and external investors within the agency framework (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), where 
information asymmetry and conflicting interests between entrepreneurs and external 
shareholders lead to agency costs. Under such theory agency costs may be controlled by 
putting in place the appropriate monitoring and incentive mechanisms to to better align the 
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entrepreneur’s behaviour with investors’ interests. Hence, the retention of a significant 
ownership stake by the entrepreneur may reduce the risk of consuming perquisites and of 
expending low managerial effort (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Bitler et al., 2006). Moreover, 
according to the agency literature, the identity of the external shareholder matters too in as 
much as certain investor types may have developed superior monitoring and incentive 
mechanisms to reduce agency costs and hence contribute to value creation. This is supposedly 
the case of private equity firms (Baker and Wruck, 1989; Jensen, 1993). Consequently, 
beyond the degree of ownership concentration, investor-type seems to matter when 
controlling for agency costs in funding entrepreneurial ventures. 
Among all sorts of investor-types, venture capitalists are an especially important source of 
finance for funding young entrepreneurial firms. Empirical studies on the relationship 
between venture capitalists (VCs) and entrepreneurs, while describing the existence of 
specific monitoring mechanisms helping to minimize the downside risk on value due to 
agency conflicts, also document a more direct contribution of these professional shareholders 
to a firm’s upside potential (Cumming and Johan, 2007), and hence to venture success. This 
added service potentially comes at two levels: (1) the identification or conception of a proper 
strategy where VCs may act as a sounding board in the strategy formulation process 
(Rosenstein et al., 1993) and (2) the professionalization of managerial capabilities (Hellman 
and Puri, 2002). Hence, the contribution of VCs goes beyond the supply of funding and 
objective financial discipline through monitoring and incentives to include some more 
specifically cognitive resources, such as new strategic ideas, knowledge and skills. Strategy 
formulation and skill acquisition imply cognitive structures and processes that are more 
complex than the mere transfer of objective information through monitoring mechanisms to 
overcome information asymmetry as traditionally prescribed by agency theory.  
In this chapter, we propose an extended conceptual framework of entrepreneur-VC 
relationship which integrates both agency costs and cognitive costs derived from the strategy 
literature1 and the dynamic capabilities approach2 to better understand the overall impact of 
venture financing on value creation. Integrating cognitive cost and value into an extended 
agency framework thus may help resolve  some potential problems for both entrepreneurs and 
investors. One important implication is a better understanding of the reasons for which certain 
VC-entrepreneur relationships are more successful than others, even in cases where agency 
costs are relatively low. In fact, our framework makes predictions on venture success based 
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on the respective cognitive attributes of VC firms and entrepreneurs. These predictions are 
consistent with Gompers et al. (2006), who empirically study the impact of matching different 
levels of VC skills with different levels of entrepreneurs’ skills on venture success. They find 
that a skilled VC contributes significant (cognitive) value only where the entrepreneur’s prior 
experience in starting a venture is either low or has been a failure. In the latter case, skilled 
VCs can identify more easily than unskilled VCs the promising entrepreneurs, in spite of the 
latter’s prior failures or lack of experience and help them acquire enhanced management 
skills.  
The first section of this chapter explains why traditional agency theory stops short of 
explaining the value-creation potential inherent in VC-entrepreneur relationships. Section 2 
then proposes a general framework of investor-entrepreneur relationships, emphasizing the 
potential cognitive role played by certain investor types. Section three applies such framework 
to the specific case of young entrepreneurial firms funded by venture capitalists, yielding 
some empirical implications. 
 
1. Entrepreneurial ventures and value creation in an agency setting 
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) made the seminal contribution to positive agency theory which 
has become the dominant theoretical framework for analyzing shareholder-manager 
relationship and its impact on the financial performance of the firm. The starting point in 
Jensen and Meckling’s analysis is an entrepreneurial firm, where the founder is the 
shareholder and the manager at the same time. In this situation, agency conflicts are absent, 
because the entrepreneur completely internalizes the value impact of his decisions. Things 
change when the entrepreneur sells outside equity because such a scenario creates an 
incentive for the founder/manager to pursue his personal interests to the detriment of the new 
shareholders. Consequently, when a new shareholder enters, agency costs arise. Such an 
increase can however be reduced by putting in place the appropriate monitoring and incentive 
mechanisms. 
The question arises, however, why the entrepreneur should open up his venture to investors in 
the first place since this brings about agency costs which will be anticipated and priced by the 
potential external shareholders anyway. Jensen and Meckling’s answer is in the recognition of 
the entrepreneur’s personal budget constraint. That is to say that the sale of outside equity 
may be the only means to capture certain value enhancing investment opportunities, simply 
by loosening the firm’s budget constraint. Thus, outside equity brings the firm on a value 
 4 
enhancing “expansion path”, as long as the incremental value generated from expansion 
exceeds the marginal agency costs induced by the decrease of the entrepreneur’s ownership 
stake. Consequently, in the Jensen and Meckling model, the possibility to create value 
through a relationship between the entrepreneur and external shareholders (e.g. venture 
capitalists) depends on the relative amount of the value supplement inherent in a new 
investment project and the added agency costs due to the more diffuse ownership structure. 
Leaning on the ownership structure model initially developed by Roe (2002) and extended by 
Charreaux (2002), we can note that selling an ownership stake to an outside shareholder 
creates value, as long as 
Vd -Ami>0, 
where Vd is the value created as a result of expanded investment opportunity and when the 
budget constraint is loosened by bringing in new investors. Ami is agency cost in a traditional 
sense, which has its root causes in the entrepreneur-manager’s pursuit of his personal interests 
under conditions of asymmetric information (perks, leisure, overinvestment). Consequently, 
the value created by an external shareholder, say a private equity firm, stems from the funds it 
contributes and its capacity of controlling managerial agency costs by devising the 
appropriate incentive and control mechanisms. In discussing the O.M. Scott LBO for instance, 
Baker and Wruck (1989) make a case for the private equity firm’s ability to design 
governance mechanisms (remuneration design, management participation, board of director 
functioning, covenants)  which help decrease agency costs.  According to traditional agency 
theory, value can hence be created in entrepreneur-investor relationships by widening the Vd -
Ami spread. It should however be noted that, in the initial agency model, the outside 
shareholders play no role in constructing the investment opportunity set itself. The latter is 
given, and the role of outside shareholders is restricted to bringing in financial capital and to 
supporting the residual risk, while controlling the objective attributes of their investments by 
maintaining transparency on information flows. In such a model, outside shareholders’ impact 
on the performance of the firm is restricted to the amount of financial capital they put on the 
table and to their monitoring skills.   
 
2. Cognitive cost and cognitive value inherent in entrepreneur-investor relations 
 
Agency theory focuses on controlling costs of conflicting interests when information is 
asymmetrically distributed. Value can hence be created by crafting the appropriate monitoring 
and incentive mechanisms to eliminate such costs. Monitoring reduces information 
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asymmetry, whereas incentives align the entrepreneur’s interests with those of external 
shareholders. Jensen (1993) considers the governance mechanisms developed by certain 
private equity firms as especially efficacious when it comes to economizing on agency costs. 
Though this may be one important explanation for the success of certain ventures, in many 
cases, the success of entrepreneurial ventures is not due to financial incentives and monitoring 
alone. In fact, one major shortcoming of agency theory lies in its implicit assumptions about 
the origin and the recognition of opportunities to create value. The origin of strategic 
opportunities and the recognition of their value creation potential are actually exogenous to 
the theory, and it is simply assumed that good (positive NPV) and bad (negative NPV) 
projects somehow exist. They are given by the environment, and to maximize value, it is 
important to have access to information about the good projects, to give incentives to the 
entrepreneur to choose the good ones and to make him expend optimal effort. 
The strategic management literature however has a longstanding tradition in recognizing that 
making a competitive strategy is as much about cognition (Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Huff, 
1990; Walsh, 1995), vision (Fransman, 1994; Witt, 1998), and difficult to imitate capabilities 
(Penrose, 1959; Teece, Pisano, Shuen, 1997), as it is about  mere information. What an 
entrepreneur perceives as the best strategy depends on her specific mindset. The same goes 
for an investor. Mindsets are influenced by individual and collective learning processes, 
which may be highly specific and path dependent. Part of such learning is tacit in nature and 
thus difficult to communicate to others. One implication of the cognitive nature of strategy 
formulation is the fact that many value creation opportunities do not exists independently of 
the people who conceive them in specific organizational contexts. The art of strategy is not 
simply about choosing the objectively best strategy in a predefined menu. Strategy is created 
in processes of individual and organizational learning (Nonaka and al., 2001), which rely on 
capabilities that go beyond the control of conflicting interests. 
Fransman (1994) illustrates the central importance of knowledge in creating and realizing the 
potential of corporate success. He actually draws a clear distinction between information, as it 
is present in agency theory, and knowledge, as employed in strategic management and 
evolutionary economics (Nelson and Winter, 1982). Information is in fact defined as objective 
data about states of the world and state-contingent outcomes. As such, it is a closed set. It may 
be asymmetrically distributed, but its transfer from one stakeholder to another is possible, 
albeit at a cost (monitoring costs). In such a context, an information’s meaning is 
unambiguous. Things change when the precise meaning of any given information depends on 
peoples’ mindsets. Thus, even if knowledge evolves with the acquisition of information, there 
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is “loose coupling” between the two concepts, which is to say that the interpretation of any 
piece of information in terms of value creation is not self evident but depends on people’s 
mental patterns at the time they receive the information. The latter may then have an impact 
on mental patterns and belief structures, but these change in a highly path-dependent way, so 
that the knowledge gained from new information is sometimes very different from one person 
to another. In fact, Fransman defines knowledge as dynamic mental constructs. So, in 
comparison to agency theory’s conception of information, knowledge is an open set. It is 
created in an ongoing learning process, part of which is tacit (Nonaka and al., 2001). 
Beyond their privileged access to information in the above defined sense, top managers’ 
specific knowledge structures can hence be crucial in an effort to create value. In their work 
on upper echelons, Hambrick and Mason (1984) actually consider a firm’s strategy to be a 
reflection of its top managers’ cognitive base and values. Since there is only loose coupling 
between objective information and knowledge gained, some people perceive opportunities for 
value creation and others do not, even if information is distributed symmetrically. In such a 
situation, monitoring and incentive alignment alone are insufficient to increase a firm’s value. 
This is because information from the environment is perceived through the lens of an 
entrepreneur’s specific mindset. The latter influences strategy formulation and, ultimately, a 
firm’s performance (Hambrick and Mason, 1984). 
One important implication is that there may be a conflict between an entrepreneur and his 
firm’s investors about the best strategy to follow, independently of any problem of conflicting 
interests. As Conner and Prahalad (1996) put it: “[...] truthful individuals honestly may 
disagree about the best present and future course of action for their business activities. Or, the 
parties may possess different mindsets generally. Discord fundamentally derives from 
personal knowledge that cannot be communicated fully to others at the time of the 
disagreement.” (p. 483). Consequently, our understanding of entrepreneur-investor relations 
may gain from admitting the existence of cognitive (or knowledge) asymmetry, which is 
different in nature from mere information asymmetry. 
Such cognitive asymmetry is likely to induce conflicts due to mutual misunderstanding 
among stakeholders (e.g. the entrepreneur and certain external shareholders). Such conflicts 
are not rooted in mutually inconsistent interests and thus cannot be tackled by the means of 
interest alignment alone, as traditional agency theory would have it. Their resolution depends 
on stakeholders’ initial skills and knowledge, as well as on their willingness and capability to 
learn. Thus cognitive conflicts cause costs which may be labelled as cognitive costs. 
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The costs stemming from cognitive conflicts are different in nature from costs rooted in 
agency conflicts. They are related to the various efforts undertaken by stakeholders to 
overcome differences in the perception of opportunities, to convince others of the relevancy 
of their conceptions (e.g. an innovative business model), as well as to eventual losses of 
efficiency due to  lasting differences in understanding. The following exhibit sketches out 
different types of potential cognitive costs in comparison with the traditional agency costs. 
 
Exhibit 1 – Agency costs and cognitive costs in entrepreneur-stakeholder relations 
Agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) Cognitive costs 
Monitoring aims at reducing information 
asymmetry (e.g. through a well informed independent 
board of directors). 
Mentoring efforts undertaken by certain 
stakeholders, such as venture capitalists, may 
influence an entrepreneur’s mindset and enable him to 
engage in relationships with different stakeholder 
groups (e.g. financial investors). 
Bonding is the activity whereby managers convey 
credible (and thus costly) signals that they will behave 
in accordance with external shareholders’ interests. 
Externalizing tacit knowledge (Nonaka et al., 2001) 
consists of an entrepreneur’s efforts to transform his 
tacit knowledge into explicit knowledge which can be 
communicated to external stakeholders, such as 
potential investors. The costs of externalization are 
different from bonding costs. The latter’s role is to 
convince shareholders that the manager’s interests are 
aligned with shareholder interests, whereas 
externalization of partially tacit mindset is aimed at 
convincing (potential) stakeholders of the intrinsic 
quality of strategic projects. 
Residual loss is due to the fact that information 
asymmetry can never be completely eliminated and 
that interest alignment is never perfect.   
Cognitive heterogeneity persists because 
mindsets are specific and path-dependent and, thus, 
never perfectly aligned, in spite of mutual interaction. 
Thus, some degree of mutual misunderstanding may 
always persist. 
 
The above presentation of cognitive costs characterizing the relationship between 
entrepreneurs and external stakeholders, such as venture capitalists, shows that these costs are 
linked to learning processes that potentially lead to a transformation of strategic knowledge 
(which may reduce the gap between different mindsets) and to an acquisition of new 
managerial capabilities. It is however important to emphasize that cognitive conflict differs 
from traditional agency conflict in a fundamental way. In fact, agency conflict is always value 
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reducing, and as long as the marginal cost of monitoring and bonding remains inferior to the 
marginal reduction in residual losses, the latter’s minimization will maximize value. Not so 
with cognitive heterogeneity, which can actually be value enhancing (Forbes and Milliken, 
1999; Hambrick et al., 1996), in as much as it opens up new strategic perspectives and allows 
to sustain an ongoing process of learning and innovation. Consequently, the specific mindsets 
of external stakeholders, different from the entrepreneur’s own, not only generate cognitive 
cost, but may also contribute cognitive value by bringing in new perspectives and valuable 
experience.  
Recognizing that certain shareholder types play more roles than just assuming risk Charreaux 
(2002) proposes an extension of Roe’s model of ownership structure by introducing two 
concepts derived from the above mentioned literature on knowledge and capabilities in 
strategic management. He does so by adding cognitive cost Ac and cognitive value Vc to the 
basic agency model. This is to recognize that certain shareholder types may contribute 
specific knowledge in the process of strategy formulation. For example, a venture capitalist 
can act as a sounding board to the entrepreneur who proposes different strategic initiatives. He 
may also help the firm acquire enhanced management skills (e.g. management control, human 
resource management …), which is a manifestation of mentoring. On the other hand, an 
external shareholder’s acquisition of a significant ownership stake may raise costs due to 
cognitive conflict Ac.  The closer the entrepreneur’s cognitive base to a specific investor’s 
mindset, due to common educational background or shared professional experience, the lower 
the degree of cognitive cost should be.  
Hence, the entry of a new shareholder creates value if 
Vd +Vc -Ami- Ac >0, that is value created through loosening the budget constraint and 
knowledge/skill added by new shareholders exceeds the sum of managerial agency cost and 
cognitive cost. This can help explain the breakdown of certain agency relationships, even in 
situations where managerial agency costs are low3. In fact, traditional agency theory would 
always predict an ownership structure to be viable, as long as  Vd  > Ami, which is the case 
when the entrepreneur keeps a significant ownership stake (Bitler et al., 2006). However, our 
discussion of knowledge asymmetry shows that certain potentially value creating ventures 
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 This is when an entrepreneur is isolated in his perception of a unique business opportunity for the realization of 
which he needs external funding. Hence for value to be created the venture needs funds, but financial investors 
just do not get the point, even though they may have ways to achieve interest alignment (by acquiring only a 
minority stake, imposing incentive contracts ...). So in spite of agency costs being absent or very low, investors 
do not enter the venture because Vd actually exists in the entrepreneur’s perception only. This situation is 
captured by the model through prohivitive cognitive costs. This means that because of inconsistent mindsets, Ac 
simply offsets Vd. Giving an investor access to the entrepreneur’s perception of opportunities would translate 
into the model by lowering Ac. 
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may never have access to external finance, although Vd  > Ami through proper incentive 
alignment, because cognitive cost is excessively high. Achieving low cognitive cost likely 
depends on the relative closeness of entrepreneurs’ and shareholders’ cognitive structure and 
ways of reasoning. In other words, when incentives are properly aligned, entrepreneurs should 
have less difficulty in raising external finance when addressing investors with mental patterns 
close to their own, due to shared educational background and/or professional experience. In 
addition, even if incentives are properly aligned through high ownership concentration and 
monitoring (Ami low) and if mental patterns are relatively close (Ac low), there still may be 
significant differences in firm performance due to investor relations, because all shareholders 
do not necessarily make the same contribution to cognitive value (Vc), where different 
mentoring skills may imply different degrees of venture professionnalization4. 
 
3. Conditions of value creation in entrepreneur-VC relationships 
 
Cognitive structures and processes should be particularly relevant in the context of 
entrepreneurship. In fact, according to Krueger (2003, p. 105), “understanding entrepreneurial 
cognition is imperative to understanding the essence of entrepreneurship, how it emerges and 
evolves. This is especially true if we wish to move from descriptive research to theory-driven 
research.” Our understanding is that this argument made for entrepreneurship in general 
applies to entrepreneurial finance likewise. Forbes (1999) advances two arguments in support 
of the idea that the understanding of cognitive structures and processes should be crucial in 
coming to grips with the dynamics of entrepreneurial ventures. First, entrepreneurship 
typically takes place in a context of high uncertainty, where resource-output-performance 
relations are very ambiguous. In such a setting, special cognitive features may be required to 
take effective action, such as the use of specific heuristics (Alvarez and Busenitz, 2001; 
Busentiz and Barney, 1997) and non linear processes of reasoning. Entrepreneurial cognition, 
thus different in nature from cognition of managers in large established firms, may be a key to 
understanding why entrepreneurs perceive opportunities where others see nothing. Beyond the 
entrepreneur’s own perception, the capacity of representing the perceived opportunities to 
stakeholders is also crucial in the effort to assemble the strategic resources to realize the 
venture (Barney, 1986; Forbes, 1999). The latter aspect, however, has received less attention 
in the literature on managerial cognition. The present chapter can be seen as a tentative 
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 Vc is the specific cognitive input made by the investor: new ideas, more professional managerial capabilities ... 
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contribution to bridge this gap, in as much as our concept of cognitive cost relates to the 
learning effort necessary to obtain shared representations of opportunities by entrepreneurs 
and key stakeholders such as potential contributors of equity finance. 
Secondly, the relatively small size of new ventures gives special significance to the 
entrepreneur’s specific mindset, probably more so than in the typical large managerial firm. 
“The implication of individual-level and group-level cognition […] may be more direct and 
immediate in the context of new venture creation than is the case in more conventional 
organizational settings. Most new ventures have only one or a few key managers at their core 
[…] Thus their beliefs and decision-making processes are likely to be more concentrated than 
those of large organizations.” (Forbes, 1999). Because of this concentration, the potential of 
cognitive conflict may be especially strong in young entrepreneurial ventures, with the 
inexperienced entrepreneur often being isolated and having a hard time communicating his 
original strategic ideas to investors from a different background than his own. The early stage 
in a firm’s lifecycle can thus be considered to be a particularly appropriate setting to study the 
concepts of cognitive cost and value in an extended model of agency relationships. 
The cognitive dimension of the investor-entrepreneur relationship may be especially 
important at an early stage in a firm’s lifecycle, when an entrepreneur’s managerial 
experience is low. In this case, the entrepreneur’s perception of strategic opportunities is 
likely to depend significantly on tacit (hard to communicate) knowledge. The latter may be an 
outcome of non linear processes of heuristic-based reasoning, which Busenitz and Barney 
(1997) consider to be a typical feature of entrepreneurs’ cognitive process. An investor’s 
ability to ascertain the strategic value of knowledge gained from such process is likely to 
depend on his own specific knowledge and on his ability to penetrate the entrepreneur’s 
specific mode of reasoning. Cognitive conflict between entrepreneurs and certain investor 
categories is thus potentially strong, if the latter lack the requisite mental skills and training. 
For example, traders at large institutional investors (IIs) are trained to make investment 
decisions based on the assumptions of rationality implicit in traditional financial economics. 
This very analytical approach to decision making may thus be at a great distance from the 
typical entrepreneur’s approach to decide on strategic opportunities. Consequently traditional 
investors are likely to have a hard time in appreciating the value creation potential of 
entrepreneurial ventures. Monitoring skills developed to control conflict of interests (source 
of traditional agency costs) are not of any help in this matter, because they suppose that good 
(positive NPV) and bad (negative NPV) investment projects can easily be distinguished by the 
investor. Where they can’t, even though Vd as perceived by the entrepreneur may be 
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potentially high, the traditional large institutional investor whose perception of strategic 
opportunity is at a long distance from the entrepreneur’s will not fund the venture, even when 
Ami (traditional agency costs) are low. The reason is the strong effort necessary to engage in 
learning which would ultimately improve mutual understanding. It would simply be too time 
consuming and too costly in relation to the financial stake. In such a situation, Ac (the 
cognitive cost due to a lack of mutual understanding) is very high, whereas Vc (the specific 
cognitive value this investor is able to bring to the venture) is typically low, so that Vd+VcII 
<AmiII+AcII. This relationship is thus not viable, the prime cause not being prohibitive agency 
costs, but a cognitive mismatch between entrepreneurs and those investors which invest at 
arm’s length.  
Those young firms where a strong competitive advantage crucially hinges on tacit knowledge 
derived from entrepreneurs’ personal experience and heuristic-based reasoning may thus have 
few possibilities to raise external finance, even if one could effectively control for problems 
of interest alignment and information asymmetry in a traditional sense (Ami). Rather than 
mere information asymmetry, these firms face problems inherent in cognitive asymmetry. 
Monitoring is insufficient to overcome the latter because of the loose coupling between 
information and knowledge (Fransman, 1994). As a matter of consequence, arm’s length 
finance is not available, because tacit knowledge cannot be readily traded at arm’s length 
(Forbes, 1999). The sharing of tacit knowledge requires specific mental skills and a certain 
learning effort. 
Certain investors, however, such as venture capitalists and business angels, may possess or 
develop these specific cognitive skills that allow them to enter into a relationship with an 
entrepreneur at a low cognitive cost. Those are investors capable of recognizing the potential 
of promising young ventures, because they are able to cope with entrepreneurial cognition. If 
the entrepreneur lacks managerial experience, these investors may not only enter at a low 
cognitive cost (Ac), but also have a strong potential cognitive input (Vc). This is the case, for 
example, when venture capitalists (VCs) play a strong role in professionalizing managerial 
functions in young ventures (Hellmann and Puri, 2002). Hence, the inequality becomes 
Vd+VcVC >Ami+AcVC.  
One testable implication is that venture capitalists should typically be expected to invest 
where the entrepreneurs’ cognition is close to their own. In fact, closeness of mental patterns 
and cognitive process reduces cognitive cost. This theoretical prediction is consistent with 
empirical evidence, according to which venture capitalists prefer to invest when there is a 
certain degree of cognitive similarity with the entrepreneur (Murneiks et al., 2007). 
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The management literature on strategic resources, managerial capabilities and learning, 
however, teaches us that knowledge structures and skills are not static but change as a result 
of dynamic path dependent processes. This implies that the concepts of cognitive cost and 
value are themselves dynamic and time dependent. As a venture matures, the inherent value 
creation potential becomes more explicit, and even shareholders without the specific cognitive 
skills of VCs and business angels may see an interest in contributing financial capital to 
further growth. The firm may then be taken public without arm’s length investors facing 
special problems of cognitive cost any more. 
The entrepreneur’s own cognitive structure may also evolve due to the accumulation of 
experience with the maturing venture and due to certain shareholders’ mentoring efforts. 
Consequently, the potential to create cognitive value (Vc ) should be higher with 
inexperienced entrepreneurs than with serial entrepreneurs, which is consistent with empirical 
evidence from Gompers et al. (2006). The latter actually show that experienced VCs have 
higher success rates than their less experienced competitors, only in cases where the venture is 
started by a first-time entrepreneur. With serial entrepreneurs, success rates are not 
significantly different between high-experience and low-experience VCs. This is consistent 
with our model in as much as it can be supposed that the success of serial entrepreneurs is a 
positive signal with respect to the quality of their entrepreneurial capabilities, which can be 
readily observed by almost any professional investor. Such a signal hence decreases potential 
cognitive cost on a wide scale. Not so with first-time entrepreneurs. In the latter case, the fit 
between the entrepreneurs’ and the VCs’ cognition should be particularly relevant in 
achieving low cognitive cost. That is because their long experience of interacting with 
entrepreneurs (some of them first-time) likely helps established VCs develop an intimate 
understanding of successful entrepreneurs’ cognitive structure and process. Hence, it can be 
supposed that experienced VCs have developed specific mindsets which help them track the 
existence of potentially value creating tacit knowledge, even in the absence of an explicit 
track record. So, in comparison with their inexperienced counterparts, the better VCs 
experience lower cognitive cost when choosing to invest alongside entrepreneurs without a 
track record. It is also in such a situation that potential cognitive value from mentoring can be 
supposed to be highest, whereas serial entrepreneurs are likely to have already acquired such 
value through the experience with their previous ventures.  
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Conclusion 
 
This conceptual chapter has set out to demonstrate that entrepreneurial finance may gain 
explanatory power with respect to entrepreneur-investor relations, by integrating the concepts 
of cognitive cost and value derived from the management literature in an extended model of 
agency. In fact, issues of cognition have been shown to be particularly relevant in the context 
of entrepreneurship (Alvarez and Busenitz, 2001;Busenitz and Barney, 1997; Forbes, 1999; 
Krueger, 2003). Our model predicts that arm’s length financing is not an option for most 
entrepreneurs, even if there was a check on agency costs due to sound monitoring and interest 
alignment mechanisms, because the average arm’s length investor faces high cognitive cost5 
while contributing low cognitive value6. In fact, potential shareholders’ identity matters, in as 
much as it determines their cognitive structure and process. The latter have an impact on 
cognitive value added and cognitive cost, due to more or less inconsistent mindsets. We have 
shown that the traditional instruments of value optimization derived from agency theory 
(interest alignment and transparent monitoring) are insufficient to fully exploit the value 
potential to be gained from entrepreneurial cognition. 
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